What we learned from Emma Hayes' victorious USWNT at the Paris Olympics (2024)

For the first time since 2012, the United States are the gold medalists in women’s Olympic soccer. A well-played ball from Korbin Albert to Mallory Swanson made all the difference, with Emma Hayes’ side overcoming an inspired Brazil 1-0 in the final.

Making the gold medal match is an achievement in its own right. Nobody knew what to expect from the USWNT at this tournament. The logistics of Hayes’ Chelsea departure meant she had just 360 friendly minutes to get her new team ready for the Games. That truncated ramp-up could have left the team ill-prepared to contend.

Instead, the players rallied behind their new boss. They reminded the world they’re able to score in bunches, to the dismay of Zambia and Germany. They showed impressive tactical nous amidst the crash-course implementation of Hayes’ ideology, neutralizing a previously terrific Japan and again using in-game adjustments to best Brazil. And, as any great team must in a major tournament, they found ways to win ugly: first against Australia, then in the semifinal against a more composed version of Germany.

There was no single method for success this summer, which is very much in line with Hayes’ whole vibe. Rather than coaching from a strict structure that forces opponents to adjust to her team’s tried-and-true approach like many modern coaches, Hayes studies an opponent to modify her approach — guided by principles and areas of emphasis rather than a team shape carved in stone — and use her team’s strengths in unique ways.

For those reasons and the small sample size of one tournament, any attempt to compile the definitive dossier of Hayes’ tactical ideology is a fool’s errand. That said, Hayes has undeniably passed her first test. One would expect her to only improve on this performance as she spends more than two months on the job and further builds the team around her principles. World, be warned.

Prominent principles

A few clear tenets of Hayes’ vision emerged across the entire tournament and seem likely to stick around based on these six performances. Let’s dig into those before looking at a few areas we might expect to see evolution in the months and years to come.

The USWNT in possession

Although this tournament was marked by changes and reinventions, eight of Hayes’ first-choice lineup — all but Tierna Davidson, Sam Coffey and Mallory Swanson — were regularly involved in last summer’s World Cup. Under Vlatko Andonovski, the United States held a narrow advantage with a possession rate of 52.9 per cent but often didn’t seem to know what to do with the ball. It led to some sloppy forced passes and frustrating turnovers at the edge of the final third, giving opponents plenty of time to set up sequences of their own as play changed hands.

Confident in her players’ collective abilities on the ball, Hayes’ version doubles down on controlling play. Their 65 per cent possession rate trailed only hypnotic defending World Cup champion Spain this summer, with rates ranging from 42.9 per cent in the final against Brazil to 78.1 per cent in the opening blowout against Zambia.

Alyssa Naeher’s utilization in build-up has been more radical than any other player’s. In the World Cup, exactly 50 per cent of her passes traveled 35 yards or further. This summer, that clip dropped to 29.5 per cent through the semifinal — the second-lowest rate of any goalkeeper in these Olympics, behind France’s Pauline Peyraud-Magnin. That change alone goes a long way toward ensuring your team keeps the ball, relying less on winning aerial duels or lobs that can fail to find a friendly target.

The reverse played out in the final: the one time the United States failed to win the possession battle, Naeher’s launch rate skyrocketed to 100 per cent (yes —each of her 27 passes went over 35 yards) and the United States held just under 43 per cent of the ball.

The gold medalists were patient in build-up, directing 34 per cent of all passes forward — down from last summer’s rate of 37.6 per cent. Rather than overly relying upon risk/reward passes, the USWNT was far more comfortable with recirculation. Critically, Hayes has quickly remedied the attacking struggles that held the United States back last summer.

We’re not done talking about Triple Espresso yet

It’s hard to overstate the importance of Swanson’s return. Her interplay with Sophia Smith is the smoothest of any left-sided option, as both players (and, often, in tandem with Trinity Rodman) weave in and out of open lanes to unsettle a defense before they even see the ball. Swanson has also provided a far greater threat while shooting and creating than Alex Morgan managed last year, while Smith looks far more at home as a striker than shunted to the wing (as she was last summer).

Meanwhile, Rodman was perhaps the attack’s heartbeat. No player came close to matching her industry in terms of entering the box.

“Put your best players in their best spots and let them cook” isn’t exactly worthy of a master’s thesis, but it works wonders in a major tournament. No team at these Olympics exceeded the USWNT’s rate of four big chances per game, nearly double the field’s average of 2.4. The United States’ shots came from an average of 15.1 yards out — third-nearest of any team, evidence of well-worked sequences setting up golden opportunities.

Unsurprisingly, that big-chance generation helped the United States rack up expected goals, an advanced metric that measures the likelihood of a chance leading to a goal based on historical data. In total, their 12.8 chances created per game trailed only Spain (16.7; they were still very good this summer) and considerably ahead of the tournament’s average of 10.5. The USWNT averaged 2.2 expected goals per game, also well above the Olympic average of 1.6.

Having great attackers is a good start toward consistently scoring, but talent only gets you so far. The forward line looked rejuvenated after years of relatively lean output by the program’s lofty standard, especially in 2023, and helped actualize the at-times frustrating potential from Hayes’ first four friendlies.

A modified defense that still gets results

For all the faults that emerged during the USWNT’s brief stay at the 2023 Women’s World Cup, few could be found in terms of defending.

Andonovski’s defense was one of the tournament’s best. Only the Netherlands and Brazil exceeded the United States’ average of 7.4 high turnovers per 90 minutes last summer, giving ample opportunities to start short-field counters (albeit, ones upon which they failed to capitalize). Their pressing was incredibly proactive, with their 7.1 PPDA (that is, passes allowed per defensive action made) registering well below the tournament average of 9.97.

Once again, it’s worth reiterating two crucial differences between a World Cup and the Olympics. Rather than carrying 23 players on the roster, Hayes has only had 18 (save for four alternates to bring in whenever players have gotten hurt). Olympic matches take place every three days, whereas the USWNT played every five days last summer.

Either as a result of that format or in line with her vision for the team, the USWNT has relaxed a bit against the ball. Their 4.0 high turnovers per 90 are well below last year’s rate, fifth among the 12 competitors. Their PPDA of 11.5 also looks far more languid, yet it’s in line with the tournament average of 12.05.

Only time will tell if this approach follows them home from France. However, the end result was still a staunch defense, allowing just 11.3 shots per 90 (tournament average was 14.4) with an average xG of 0.08 per shot faced (average was 0.11). Having world-class defenders like Naomi Girma will help no matter a coach’s approach, but the focus on energy conservation and retaining defensive shape hasn’t made the United States more vulnerable.

Areas to refine

Fouls and dead balls

Although there’s no specific term for a fear of a whistle’s blow, it nestles into general phonophobia — a fear of loud sounds. Throughout the tournament, the United States was less effective after the referee stopped play.

Heading into Saturday’s final, the United States ranked third by averaging 8.5 set plays per 90 minutes, 20 per cent more than the tournament average. However, it took them an average of 25.5 set pieces to yield a goal. 16.7 per cent of their goals came from set pieces — the lowest rate of any team that converted at least one dead-ball situation this summer.

Corner kicks also proved difficult to convert. Only 9.7 per cent of their corners were converted into shots, far below the average of 20.5 per cent. Considering the United States averaged the second-most corners of any team (5.5), it added up to a lot of wasted opportunities that could have given some breathing room in their closer contests — roughly one shot per every two games.

Out of possession, the United States played to keep the ball rolling. On average, a team fouled an opponent shortly after committing a turnover 4.6 per cent of the time. The United States checked in at a 1.3 per cent rate of these tactical fouls, making them the only team to register a rate below 3.3 per cent. Their 5.2 fouls committed per game was well below the average of 9.2. While that does keep players from risking seeing a card and limits conceded set pieces, it also allows opponents to sustain momentum on the ball.

There’s no one best practice to win a game using the referee’s whistle as an asset, but it’s a bit of gamesmanship that’ll likely evolve in the coming years.

A miasmic midfield

In the ‘pros’ category, we touched on the team’s patience and willingness to embrace recirculation sequences. A typical sequence of build-up often looked something like this: Naeher prodded the ball to one of her center backs, who then shunted it wide to their nearest full back. That full back would check their corresponding winger’s run and either launch it beyond the defender — either lobbed to wide areas, or on the ground in the half-space — or pass it back to the center back to switch play to the other side.

Ideally, that full back could also consider the central channel and get the ball to a midfielder to operate in the middle of the field. Too often, that option is not presenting itself if Coffey is not in the right spot every time. Why? For all of the players who are seeing improvement in Hayes’ early days, the same can’t be said for Lindsey Horan, the team’s captain and a rare remaining holdover of the 2019 world champions.

Horan has been a mainstay of United States lineups since injuries so cruelly curtailed Sam Mewis’ career. Converted from being a striker to a midfielder during Jill Ellis’ tenure, Horan played as a box-to-box midfielder under Andonovski. Her reading of a game allowed her to operate as the team’s main possessive hub last summer, trusting her to judge whether the team should progress into the final third or hold onto the ball by sending it backwards.

This summer, Horan’s role has changed slightly. When the team is out of possession, she plays level with Coffey at the midfield’s base. In possession, she scurries to play on the same line as Rose Lavelle, serving as an auxiliary striker to complement Lavelle’s playmaking. In theory, Horan should be able to crash the box later than Smith to offer an aerial threat for late crosses and an edge-of-box shooting alternative. Instead, Horan has been stationed by the center circle, struggling to make as much of an impact in all phases as she previously had.

Entering the final, Horan completed 69.8 per cent of her passes in the attacking third. In theory, that suggests she played higher-risk balls to find a shooter. However, it’s the lowest of the four USWNT midfielders who logged 200 minutes in the Games, trailing Korbin Albert (81 per cent), Coffey (77.8 per cent) and even Lavelle (72.5 per cent).

It ended up being a moot point in the final, as Lavelle’s injury concerns brought Albert into the lineup and pushed Horan closer to the forward line. Still, one would assume that Hayes will want to incorporate both Horan and Lavelle in her lineups moving forward. We’ll see how that ends up being working —or if it’s possible — in the coming months.

Subs (or the lack of)

Along with questions about Horan’s performances, one criticism of the team’s run has been Hayes’ unwillingness to rotate and relatively lax substitution patterns. Only three teams averaged fewer substitutions before the 75th minute than Hayes’ 2.0 per game, while her average time of making a change (74.1 minutes into a game) was tardier than the tournament average of 68.6. If that seems insignificant to you, ask a player how difficult another five minutes of high-stakes play can be when you’re already gassed.

It’s one thing to trust your starters when you’re swapping out starters to ensure as many players are at full fitness as possible. However, Hayes’ insistence on playing with a set preferred lineup that only changed after injuries or suspension often left the team lagging in the second half. Whereas the United States averaged 1.2 goals in the first half of games, that rate plummeted to 0.5 in the second half. Some of this can be attributed to opponents making adjustments, but such a staggering drop-off is also cause for concern.

That said, Hayes’ final season with Chelsea shows that she may be quicker to make in-game changes as she gets more familiar with a greater number of players in her pool. In the WSL last season, Chelsea averaged 3.1 subs before the 75th minute, with her changes coming with an average game clock time of 67.9 minutes.

The good news now is that, with the tournament concluded, her regular starters can finally enjoy some rest. They’ve certainly earned it, with hardware to show for their perseverance.

It’s all a work in progress, even as the United States has returned to a more prominent place on the Olympic podium. The early signs under Hayes could hardly be more encouraging —and she’s only just getting started.

(Top photo: Getty Images)